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Administrative Law — Contract Law — FPC Summary Action In
Natural Gas Pipeline Interim Curtailment Practice — Consolidated
Edition Co. v. FPC 1 —Since 1970, the chronic, nationwide natural gas
shortage has left interstate pipeline companies increasingly unable to
fulfill supply commitments, necessitating the curtailment of supplies
to certain customers during peak demand periods. 2 As a result of the
shortage, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) has sought to develop
a regulatory scheme through which to shape pipeline curtailment
practices. In Consolidated Edison, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed3 petitions filed by cus-
tomers of three major interstate gas pipelines," against recent FPC in-
itiatives in implementing Order No. 467 5 "governing the 'utilization
and conservation of natural gas resources,' "6 Order No. 467 provides
that the public interest will best be served by assigning delivery
priorities based on the ultimate consumer use made of gas (end use),
rather than on the basis of contractual commitments (pro rata).' To
effectuate this determination, the Commission established nine "prior-
ity of service" categories based on the end use criteria!' The Commis-
sion indicated that allocation or tariff' schedules not in conformity
with 467 priorities would be subject to suspension and final disap-
proval as "preferential or discriminatory," even though the order
purports to be only a general statement of policy and not a binding
rule.'°
The authority of the FPC to impose a 467-type plan on the
pipelines after evidentiary Commission hearings and a decision on the
record was not contested in Consolidated Edison." Rather, at issue was
' 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1972). See generally
FPC, STAFF REPoRT No, 2 oN NATioNnt. GAS Sui'rt.v AN!) DEMAND 1971-1990, at xi
(1972); 1974 FPC ANN, REF ,. 34-35; 1973 FPC ANN. REP. 34. An early history of the
emerging natural gas shortage and attendant conflicts is contained in Comment, FPC
Natural Gas Allocation: Curtailment in Context, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1370 (1972).
3 The Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717r(b) (1970), provides for review of Com-
mission orders by "the court of appeals of the United States for any circuit wherein the
natural-gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District o1' Columbia." Such
review, however, is only available "within sixty days after the order of the Commission
upon the application far rehearing ..." pin I'SMInt to 15 U.S.C. §717r(a) (1970).
1 512F.2dat1336no.1-3.
18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1975). Order No. 467 was earlier amended by Order No,
467-A, 38 Fed. Reg. 2171 (1973) and again in Order No. 467-B, 38 Fed. Reg. 6384
(1973). These orders will be referred to collectively as Order No. 467, or simply 467,
unless otherwise necessary for clarity.
° 512 F.2d at 1336.
7 38 Fed. Reg. 1503, 1503-04 (1973).
$ 18 C.F.R. § 2.78. Order No. 467 delivery priorities are discussed by the court in
Consolidated Edison. 512 F.2d at 1336-37. See text at notes 65-67 infra.
9 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6385 (1973).
38 Fed. Reg. 1503 (1973). See also, Order No. 467-B, 38 Fed. Reg. 6384,
6384-85 (1973).
" 512 F.2d at 1338.
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the Commission's use of summary action" in shaping the allocation
practices of pipelines during the interim period pending hearings on
permanent curtailment plans.'" The petitioners argued that the
Commission's summary effectuation of the various interim curtailment
plans filed by pipelines in conformity with Order No. 467,' 4 and its
admonitory rejection of alternative allocation schemes previously
negotiated between the pipelines and petitioners were ultra vires
actions.'" Specifically, petitioners contended that the FPC had ex-
ceeded its power by seeking to implement Order No. 467 under the
summary procedures provided in section 4 of the Natural Gas Act,'"
instead of under the more formal and extensive hearing requirements
of section 5 of that Act."
Following the Commission's refusal to extend the expiring
negotiated plans, appeals were filed in which the pipeline customers
contested the legality of 467-type curtailment' plans submitted by
pipelines to the FPC, and sought stays to prevent the implementation
of these plans.'" The court granted stays in cases involving two of the
pipelines, since the negotiated plans were found to be as protective of
customers as alternative 467 plans filed for the 1973-74 winter heat-
ing season.'" These stays remained in effect through the winter of
1974-75, although one of the non-467 plans was renegotiated to avoid
customer injury." A stay was denied to customers of the remaining
pipeline. The court instead permitted a 467 filing to take effect, after
finding that existing negotiated plans would no longer provide ade-
quate customer protection."' As the Commission subsequently com-
pleted hearings on permanent curtailment plans for each of the
pipelines, the disposition of these cases had the practical effect of de-
termining the interim phase of the allocation controversy." Since
there was no way of knowing whether the FPC would issue its final
decision on permanent curtailment plans in time for the 1975-76 heat-
ing season, the court sought to resolve the uncertainty under which
" "Summary action," sometimes called emergency or temporary action, is an in-
formal procedure utilized by both federal and state administrative agencies, pending an
adjudicatory hearing. The primary justification for summary action ties in the necessity
for the government to act immediately if public policy is to be enforced at all. Freed-
man, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CAL L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1972).
" 512 F.2d at 1338.
" Sec id. at 1337-38 for a description of pipeline filings pursuant to Order No.
467.
"Id. at 1338-39.
" 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1970). Section 4 procedures are discussed in text at notes
111-14 infra.
" 15 U.S.C.	 717d (1970). Section 5 procedures are discussed in text at notes
115-18 infra.
"Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 511 F,2d 372, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per
curiam).
io
"Id. at 376-81.
" Id. at 376 n.4.
21 512 F.2d at 1338.
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both the Commission and the parties labored with respect to the in-
terim curtailment plans, and proceeded to the merits. 23
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld the FPC's summary implementation of 467-type plans.
Specifically, the court HELD: In view of shortages necessitating cur-
tailment and prompt FPC action, (1) the Commission may properly
take into account the end use of indirect customers 24 for curtailment
purposes; 25 and (2) the Commission practice of allowing interim
pipeline schedules to go into effect without a preliminary finding that
the schedules were non-discriminatory was not arbitrary."
The court in Consolidated Edison concluded that the FPC had
properly exercised its authority to shape pipeline curtailment practices
pending the final determination of allocation plans after hearings."
Three findings by the court provided the factual basis supporting this
conclusion: (1) that pipelines retained considerable freedom to choose
among alternative schemes in filing curtailment plans;" (2) that
Order No. 467 did not govern all aspects of natural gas allocation;"
and (3) that FPC action in shaping curtailment policies under 467 did
not appear to be unduly oriented toward the interests of the regu-
lated pipelines. 30 The court's recognition of Commission summary ac-
tion in implementing curtailment powers was coupled, however, with
an awareness that the effects of curtailment "can be irrevocable.""
Consequently, the court found that the Commission had a separate
responsibility—quite apart from its efforts to guarantee emergency re-
lief pursuant to Order No. 467-A 32—to monitor interim curtailment
plans in operation pending adoption of permanent allocation
schemes. 33
 Finally, the court acknowledged that the power to make
such gas allocation adjustments as may appear warranted was a neces-
sary adjunct to the FPC's monitoring and "oversight function." 34
This note will initially explore the impact of Consolidated Edison
on the development of curtailment regulation by the FPC in response
23 Id.
24 Natural gas customers include: "industrial 'direct sales' customers, purchasing
gas for their own consumption, and 'resale' customers, purchasing gas for distribution
to ultimate consumers." FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. 621, 623 (1972).
"Indirect" customers are those ultimate consumers who purchase gas from "resale" cus-
tomers. Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1345.
25 512 F.2d at 1345-46.
" Id. at 1344-45.
"id. at 1342.
28 1d. at 1341.
" Id.
"Id. at 1342..
31 Id. at 1343.
32 The Commission has indicated that curtailment schedules should provide for
emergency supplemental deliveries where required to forestall irreparable injury to life
or property. 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(a)(4) (1975).
33 512 F.2d at 1343.
34 Id.
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to the current natural gas shortage. Next, the implementation of
Commission curtailment practices through summary action under sec-
tion 4 of the Natural Gas Act will be discussed. The FPC's "oversight
function," posited by the District of Columbia Circuit as a check on
the exercise of Commission summary action, will then be evaluated
and improvement through public involvement suggested. Finally, an
observation will be offered as to the effect of Order No. 467 on the
question of pipeline liability for failure to meet contract supply re-
quirements.
I. THE CHALLENGE TO FPC CURTAILMENT POWER
The prospect of an inadequate supply of natural gas has been
anticipated since the early 1950's, 35 with the classic formulation of the
problem expressed even earlier in Justice Jackson's now famous dis-
sent in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas CO. 30 The heart of the problem, as he
saw it, is "the elusive, exhaustible, and irreplaceable nature of natural
gas itself."37 Yet, the emergence of actual shortages in 1970 came with
a suddenness and severity which the FPC had failed to anticipate." In
1971, as a result of these shortages, the Commission moved to reverse
the negative effects of past regulatory practices,39 which were thought
to have contributed to the current scarcity of natural gas. 4 ° This initial
response to the shortage included the promulgation of a series of
measures authorizing emergency purchases by pipelines facing short-
ages, in order to avoid major disruptions of power supplies.'" When
these measures proved inadequate, the FPC promulgated Order No.
431 42 in an attempt to promote uniform curtailment practices. Order
No. 431 directed 'Jurisdictional" pipeline companies 43 expecting
periods of shortage to file revised tariff schedules containing a cur-
tailment plan and impliedly suggested that curtailment priorities in
those schedules should be based on the end use made of the gas. 44
The Commission indicated that such tariffs and plans, if approved,
33 Williams, Some Ingredients of a National Oil and Gas Policy, 27 STAN L. REV. 969
n.1 (1975).
38 320 U.S. 591, 628-60 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 629.	 .
38 Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1342.
3° 1972 FPC ANN. REP. 37.
4 ° See, e.g., Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of
Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941, 943-85 (1973) for a discussion of the nega-
tive impact that the FPC's regulation of wellhead prices had upon production.
4 ' Each of these orders is summarized by the Court in FPC v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 628 (1972).
43 18 Fed. Reg. 7505 (1971).
43 "A 'jurisdictional' pipeline transports natural gas in interstate commerce and
for that reason is subject to FPC certification jurisdiction. The 'jurisdictional' label is
also sometimes used to apply to sales, in which case it refers to interstate sales for re-
sale, which are subject to Commission rate regulation." FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 406 U.S. 621, 626 n.1 (1972).
" See 18 C.F.R. § 2.70(b)(2)(1)(ii) (1974); of 38 Fed. Reg. 1503, 1503-04 (1973).
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would in all respects be controlling as to gas allocation "notwithstand-
ing inconsistent provisions in [prior] sales contracts."'
A jursidictional attack on the FPC's authority to promulgate
Order No. 431 has provided the principal challenge to Commission
curtailment power. In FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 46 pipeline
customers contested curtailment plans filed by pipelines pursuant to
Order No. 431 covering direct interstate sales of natural gas.'" The
Supreme Court held that the FPC has power to regulate curtailment
by pipeline companies of such sales." The Commission's curtailment
powers, the Court found, arise out of both the FPC's transportation
jurisdiction4 ° and section 16 of the Natural Gas Act, 5 ° which empow-
ers the agency to take necessary or appropriate steps to carry out pro-
visions of the Act."
The Supreme Court's holding in Louisiana Power & Light was
based upon the "attractive gap" theory, originally advanced in FPC v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp." Under this theory, federal regu-
lation is to broadly complement that provided by the states, "so that
there would be no 'gaps' for private interests to subvert the public
welfare." 55 The theory does not admit to the possible creation of a
"no man's land" in disputes over the scope of regulatory authority."
Thus, in examining areas in which Congressional authority is not ex-
plicit, courts ask whether the reserved powers of the states can prac-
ticably regulate a situation. If they cannot, then the courts are "im-
pelled to decide that federal authority, governs."" Reasoning that cur-
tailment power over direct interstate sales was beyond the competence
of state regulatory agencies, the Court in Louisiana Power & Light
found that grant of such power to be within the Congressional intent
in framing a broad and complementary federal regulatory scheme
under the Natural Gas Act." The Commission, the Court declared,
45 18 C.F.R. § 2.70(b)(7).
46 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
47 Id. at 631-32.
45 Id. at 647.
"Section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970) provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural
gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial,
industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such
transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or
sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the
facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of
natural gas.
5° 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970).
" Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. at 642.
52 365 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1961).
53 406 U.S. at 631.
" 365 U.S. at 19-20.
55 Id.
55 See 406 U.S. at 632-33. But see Note, 61 Geo. L. J. 833, 840-41 (1973) for the
proposition that In]othing in the legislative history [of the Natural Gas Act] indicates
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"must possess broad powers to devise effective means to meet [its] re-
sponsibilities [and] 'to make the pragmatic adjustments which may
be called for by particular circumstances.' "57 These broad powers,
then, are available to the FPC to fill any gaps affecting the public in-
terest in the federal regulation of curtailment.
The scope of the Commission's 'power to shape interim curtail-
ment plans under Order No. 431 was further elucidated in American
Smelting & Refining Co. v. FPC. 58 There, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit examined the precise basis and extent of the Commission's au-
thority to issue interim orders. 59 Declaring that "the Commission's
power to promulgate, interim curtailment plan is not born of
emergency," the court found that the Commission's power is based
upon "the statutory authorization to perform any and all acts neces-
sary or appropriate for the implementation of the Natural Gas Act." 6 "
The court reasoned that the exigent circumstances of.the natural gas
shortage neither create special powers in the Commission, nor abro-
gate procedural requirements for valid administrative action." It thus
appears that the existence of the gas shortage is only one of several
factors to be considered by the FPC in determining initially whether
an interim curtailment order is necessary, and if found to be so,
whether the proposed order is just and reasonable." At the same
time, the significance of the "emergency" factor seems to have been
acknowledged in Louisiana Power & Light, where the Supreme Court
indicated that a shortage of marked proportions should be considered
in defining the FPC's discretion to choose among available procedures
in its curtailment practices."
The fact that curtailment plans, filed by pipelines pursuant to
Order No. 431 continued to reflect conflicting views as to the appro-
priate priorities applicable in supplying customers impelled the FPC
to issue more specific policy guidelines in Order No. 467." Under
Order No. 467, a preferential curtailment system based on ultimate
that Congress thought that any direct user of gas would be reached by the Act ... ."
Still, it is clear that Congress did not desire that any important aspect of control over
the distribution of natural gas be left unregulated. Transcontinental Gas Corp., 365 U.S.
at 19. Authority for Federal curtailment jurisdiction over direct sales may be derived in
principle, then, from Congress' broad motivation of attempting to create a comprehen-
sive and effective regulatory scheme to protect natural gas consumers. Cf: id, at 19-22.
" 406 U.S. at 642, quoting FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586
(1942).
" 494 F.2d 925, 932-33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).'
" Id.- at 933.
60 id,
61 Id.
62 Id.
62 See 406 U.S. at 642-45; accord, Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1342.
04 38 Fed. Reg. 6384 (1973). See Muys, EPC Allocation of Natural Gas Supply Short-
Prorationing, Priorities and Perplexity, 20 RpcKY M'r. M. L. INST. 301, 307-09 (1975)
for a description of plans filed pursuant to Order No. 431.
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consumer use emerged;" it ranged from highest priority for residen-
tial, small commercial, and other "human needs" uses, through mod-
erate priority for industrial processing use, down to lowest priority for
boiler use." This preferential scheme further required the full cur-
tailment of the lower priority customers to be accomplished, before
curtailment of any higher priority customers could be commenced."
In Order No. 467-A, the FPC directed pipeline companies to incorpo-
rate procedures into their schedules permitting an immediate re-
sponse to emergency situations arising- during periods of shortage."
Order No. 467-B provided a final clarification of the Commission's
plain intent that "end use of natural gas [be the] controlling [factor] in
curtailment situations."" Since these orders purported to be general
policy statements, the Commission did not direct the pipelines to file
conforming tariffs. 76
 However, while the FPC acknowledged that
pipelines were free to file curtailment schemes of their own choice,"
this recognition was accompanied by a warning that those filings not
in accordance with 467 would •
 be subject to possible suspension as
"preferential or discriminatory." 72 Plans deviating from the FPC's
priority scheme could only gain the Commission's endorsement in
"appropriate circumstances;" that is, upon an evidentiary showing by
the pipeline that its 'plan better served the public interest than a
467-type plan."
An initial procedural challenge to FPC curtailment practices
under Order No. 467 was brought before the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC. 74
On review of Order No. 467, the court concluded that the order was
properly couched as a statement of policy, rejecting petitioner's claim
that the order was in effect a substantive rule. 75 As a statement of pol-
icy, 467 was exempt from the rulemaking requirement of the Adminis-
83 For a discussion of the background of Order No. 467, see Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
88 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(a)(1)(i)-(ix) (1975).
67
 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(a)(3) (1975).
96
 38 Fed. Reg. 2171, 2171-72 (1973), amending 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1975). 	 .
69 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6385 (1973) amending 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1975). See also 49
F.P.C. 1036, 1037 (1973) (order denying motions for reconsideration, clarification or
modification of Order No. 467-B).
7° While the court in Consolidated Edison indicated only that the FPC "declined" to
direct pipelines to file conforming tariffs, 512 F.2d at 1337, such "direction" would
clearly have been beyond Commission powers since it would have necessitated treat-
ment of 467 as a substantive order, in violation of the rulemaking requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 37-40 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6385 (1973).
72 Id.
73 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 49 F.P.C.
1036, 1037 (1973) . (order denying motions for reconsideration, clarification or modifica-
tion of Order No. 467-B); Muys, supra note 64, at 323.
74 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 45.
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trative Procedure Act" that a hearing or opportunity to comment he
provided." The court found that Order No. 467 was not a binding
norm, since its practical effect was not finally determinative of the is-
sues or rights to which it was addressed, but merely provided initial
guidelines for pipelines as a means of facilitating curtailment
planning." Despite this expansive attitude toward the FPC's curtail-
ment regulation, the District of Columbia Circuit pointed out that the
courts are charged with the duty of policing agency action to insure
that such guidelines are not, in fact, treated as substantive rules."
The court in Consolidated Edison exercised the policing function
contemplated in Pacific Gas through its review of FPC initiatives in
implementing Order No. 467. 80 In both Consolidated Edison and Pacific
Gas, pipeline customers alleged procedural infirmities in contesting
the FPC's end use priority scheme. In Pacific Gas, petitioners argued
that the FPC had not satisfied the hearing requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act in promulgating Order No. 467, 81 while in
Consolidated Edison, the claim was made that hearing requirements
under the Natural Gas Act were not met in implementing the order."
American Smelting had appeared to open the doors to precisely such
procedural challenges." However, in Pacific Gas and Consolidated
Edison these doors were rapidly shut as Commission action, both in
promulgating and implementing the order was upheld upon judicial
review." Indeed, the court's affirmance in Consolidated Edison of FPC
implementation of Order No. 467 through "raised eyebrow
techniques"" followed logically from the Supreme Court's acknowl-
edgement in Louisiana Power & Light that the Commission must pos-
sess broad powers to devise effective means to meet its
responsibilities."
FPC curtailment practice under Order No. 467 was also
contested 87 on jurisdictional grounds in Consolidated Edison." The
" 5 U.S.C. 553 (1970).
" 506 F.2d at 45.
7" See id. at 41. See also 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6384-85 (1973).
78 506 F.2d at 41.
"See 512 F.2d at 1339-42.
" 506 F.2d at 36.
82 512 F.2d	 1339.
" See text at note 61 supra.
"See text at notes 25-27, 75-77.
85 While the court in Consolidated Edison referred to "raised eyebrow techniques,"
512 F.2d at 1341, it failed to specify what kind of agency action comprised this regula-
tory technique. It appears, however, that such techniques are similar to agency "speak-
ing orders," differing principally with respect to the degree of discretion remaining
available to regulated concerns in shaping their future activities. A "speaking order" is
an order that indicates, with more or less specificity, what kind of proposal will be
deemed acceptable by an agency, and allowed to go into effect without suspension. W.
GELLHORNE & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS, 685 (fith ed. 1974).
" See 512 F.2d at 1341-42.
87 This argument was primarily advanced by petitioner Battle Creek Gas Co. 512
F.2d at 1345 n.76.
88 512 F.2d at 1345.
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court's response well illustrates the expansive nature of the "attractive
gap" approach to FPC regulatory authority. In developing its priority
scheme based on ultimate consumer use," the FPC scrutinized the use
made of gas by nonjurisdictional pipeline customers. Consumers of
natural gas acquire the gas either in purchases directly from the
pipelines, or indirectly from a customer of the pipeline. Although the
Commission has acknowledged that some gas sales to indirect con-
sumers do not fall within its jurisdiction,90 Order No. 467 placed all
direct and indirect customers in the same priority of service category
where their use of gas was comparable." In Consolidated Edison it was
alleged that this arrangement was impermissible on the ground that
the FPC lacked jurisdiction to prevent discrimination by pipelines be-
tween direct and indirect customers."
Congress defined the FPC's jurisdiction in section 1(b) of the
Natural Gas Act." Section 1(b) grants to the Commission jurisdiction
over all sales and resales of natural gas in interstate commerce. 94 In
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana,"
the Supreme Court delineated the scope of this jurisdictional grant:
Three things and three things only Congress drew within
its own regulatory power, delegated by the Act to its agent,
the Federal Power Commission. These were: (1) the trans-
portation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale
in interstate commerce for resale; and (3) [the regulation
of natural gas companies engaged in such transportation
or sale. 96
In upholding Order No. 431 in Louisiana Power & Lights the
Supreme Court brought FPC responsibilities in curtailment practice
under the umbrella of the Commission's transportation jurisdiction."
In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the FPC possesses broad
power to devise effective means to meet its responsibilities." In light
of this acknowledgment, the court in Consolidated Edison held that the
FPC may consider end use, even by indirect customers, where such
consideration is germane to the meaningful execution of the
Commission's curtailment function. 99 Thus, while the Commission
may not exercise jurisdiction over certain customers, scrutiny of the
" Id.
"° 38 Fed. Reg. 1503, 1504 (1973).
01 18 C.F.R. 2.78(a)(3). The Commission's rationale for this action was that cus-
tomers with similar usages for the fuels should be accorded the same treatment to avoid
any undue discrimination or preference among them. 38 Fed. Reg. 1503, 1504 (1973).
91 512 F.2d at 1345.
93 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970).
94 See id. See note 49 supra for text of statute.
95 332 U.S. 507 (1947).
96 1d. at 516.
°T 406 U.S. at 642.
95 Id.
99 512 F.2d at 1345-46.
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use of gas by such customers is not precluded, since it is a necessary
adjunct to the FPC's power to fashion effective curtailment
practices.'°°
This expansion of the Commission's powers by the court in
Consolidated Edison is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of congressional intent in framing the FPC's duties under the
Natural Gas Act; namely, that there be no "gaps" in federal regula-
tory power through which the public . interest could be subverted."'
Thus, where a court finds a particular duty for the FPC set forth by
Congress under the Natural Gas Act, that court is, in effect, required
to find that Congress has also delegated to the Commission ample
power to discharge that duty, even though such authority may not be
explicit."' The District of Columbia Circuit's holding in Consolidated
Edison—that the Commission may consider the end use of non-
jurisdictional indirect customers—is indicative of the operative impact
of the Supreme Court's "attractive gap" rationale in the very real set-
ting of the current natural gas shortage. It appears, then, that the
FPC has ample authority to evaluate all factors bearing on the public
interest in its curtailment practices, where such consideration facili-
tates the discharge of Commission responsibilities under the Natural
Gas Act.'"
II. SUMMARY ACTION UNDER SECTION 4:
EVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. Challenges to FPC Actions under Section 4
Having acknowledged FPC power to implement 467 type orders
in general, the court in Consolidated Edison turned to the question of
whether the FPC had properly implemented 467-type plans under the
summary procedures provided in section 4 1 04 rather than under the
more extensive procedures of section 5b 05 of the Natural Gas Act.'"
Sections 4 and 5 are the principal procedural mechanisms through
which the Commission fashions curtailment practices. These
'" See id.
'°' See text at notes 53-55 supra.
"'E See Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. at 631-42; Transcontinental Gas, 365 U.S.
at 19-20; cf. Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 33-34 (5th Cir. 1975); Consolidated
Edison, 512 F.2d at 1346 ri.79.
"I See 512 F.2d at 1345-46, In Continental Oil Co. v, FPC, 319 F.2d SI (5th Cir.
1975), the court held that the Commission could require regulated pipeline companies
to furnish information about their nonregulable intrastate activity to facilitate the dis-
charge of the agency's curtailment responsibilities. Id. at 32. Cf. Transcontinental Gas, 365
U.S. at 8, where the Supreme Court acknowledged that under section 7(a) of the
Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970) which grants the FPC the power to issue
certificates of convenience and necessity, the Commission has the authority "to evaluate
all factors bearing on the public interest" (emphasis in original).
"4 15 U.S.C. § . 717c (1970).
1 °5 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1970).
imSee 512 F.2d at 1338-39.
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mechanisms were not, however, designed with curtailment regulation
in mind.'" They were designed to give the Commission sufficient
power to check the threats of monopolistic market control by a "hand-
ful of holding companies."'" As a result, Congress specifically
granted the FPC in these procedural sections broad powers "to pro-
tect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas
companies."'" The central purpose behind the enactment of the
Natural Gas Act, then, was not curtailment regulation; rather, it was
one of consumer protection through the guarantee of just and
reasonable gas prices to the public."°
Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act provides for just and reasona-
ble rates through industry rate-making by requiring natural gas com-
panies to file new schedules for any "rate, charge, classification or ser-
vice" with the FPC thirty days prior to their effective date."' Absent a
challenge by the Commission, such schedules become effective au-
tomatically after the expiration of a thirty day period.'" If the Com-
mission objects, it is empowered to suspend the proposed schedule for
an additional five months." 3
 During this period, hearings are held to
determine whether the rates are just and reasonable, with the com-
pany bearing the burden of proof." 4
Section 5, on the other hand, is the procedural mechanism
through which agency rate-making is to be accomplished. Under this
section, the FPC is granted the discretion to hold investigatory hear-
ings to determine whether an existing or proposed schedule is "un-
just, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential."" 3 Such
hearings may also be granted upon complaint by pipeline
customers.'" In section 5 proceedings, "the FPC must afford in-
terested parties a full hearing on the reasonableness of the tariff
schedule before taking any remedial action."'" In contrast to section 4,
if a schedule is found to be unlawful under this standard, the Com-
mission may impose a reasonable and fair alternative." 3
In Consolidated Edison, the basic issue was whether implementa-
tion of 467-type interim curtailment plans under section 4 actually
"7 Comment, Conservation and the Commission: The Growth of Regulation of the End
Use of Natural Gas by the FPC, 3 ENV. AFF. 527, 530 (1974).
1 °' See Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 610-11,
'°8 1d. at 610.
"° See, Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. at 638; Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co, v.
FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 143 (1960). See generally Dellane, Highlights of Legislative History of the
Federal Power Act of 1935 and The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 30
(1945).
'" 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1970).
" 1
 15 U.S.C. 717c(e) (1970).
11.4m.
" 1
 15 U.S.C. 717d(a) (1970).
"° Id.
"T Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. at 643.
" 8 Compare Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1970), with Sec-
tion 5 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. 717d(a) (1970).
270
NOTES
constituted agency rather than industry rate-making." 9 Petitioners al-
leged that these plans had not been voluntarily filed by the pipelines,
but were the result of strong suggestion—de facto rate-making—by
the FPC. 12° They argued that Order No. 467—nominally a nonbind-
ing policy directive—had been treated by the Commission as a
substantive rule for regulating gas allocation."' Petitioners in this re-
spect pointed to the coercive language in Order No. 467-B itself, 122
 as
well as to admonitions voiced by the Commission in orders denying
requested extensions of operative non-467 schedules. 123 They con-
tended that the Commission's alleged practice of giving summary ef-
fectuation only to 467-type plans amounted to an agency-imposed
change in pipeline filings, from the non-467 plans then in operation.
This practice was illegal, petitioners argued, since the FPC cannot im-
pose a change in existing tariff schedules without complying with the
hearing requirements contained in section 5 of the Natural Gas
Act.'"
According to the FPC, the purpose of Order No. 467 and sup-
plementary amendments was merely to inform the public of those
types of curtailment plans that would most likely receive Commission
approval. 125
 Yet, while the FPC suggested that it would remain flexi-
ble in implementing its priority of delivery policies,"° it consistently
refused at the outset to permit the extension of any interim non-467
curtailment plan negotiated by pipelines and their customers."'
Nevertheless, in Consolidated Edison, the Commission maintained that
its actions in implementing Order No., 467 did not constitute de facto
rate-mak i ng.' 28
Petitioner's section 5 claim was advanced in the face of Louisiana
Power & Light, where the Supreme Court upheld Order No. 431's re-
liance on pipeline-initiated filings under section 4. 129
 In Louisiana
Power & Light, the Court endorsed the application of section 4 proce-
dures in situations requiring prompt Commission action, to avoid the
disadvantageous effects of any delay that might attend the hearings
See 512 17.2d at 1339.
'" ld. at 1339-40.
' 21 See id.
"2
 See 38 Fed, Reg. 6384, 6385 (1973), where the FPC indicated that filings not
in accord with the terms of 467 would be suspended and investigated and subject to
final disapproval as "preferential or discriminatory."
722 See Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1340 & nn.39, 40.
' 24 1d. at 1338.39.
122
 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6385 (1973),
'22 See id,
1 " Muys, FPC Allocation of Natural Gas Supply Shortages: Prorationing, Priorities and
Perplexity, 20 ROCKY MT. M. L. INST. 301, 351 (1975). However, from subsequent show-
ings made by the FPC in Consolidated Edison demonstrating acceptance of some pro rata
interim curtailment plans, it appears that the Commission demonstrated at least a lim-
ited flexibility as promised in Order No. 467-A. See Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at
1341 n.47; Muys, supra, at 351-54.
I n See 512 F.2d at 1342.
19 See 406 U.S. at 644-47.
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required under section 5. 135 Petitioners in Consolidated Edison
contested the FPC's initiatives in implementing Order No. 467 under
section 4, however, in the belief that the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in Moss v. GAB' 3 ' provided a basis for their claim.' 32 Specifi-
cally, they alleged that the FPC's actions with respect to 467 were
analogous to the Civil Aeronautics Board's (CAB) "speaking order" 133
which the court in Moss, under a similar statutory scheme,'" had in-
validated as illegal agency rather than legitimate industry
rate-making.' 35
In Moss, a CAB order had outlined a price formula for domestic
airlines.'" The CAB subsequently permitted tariff schedules embody-
ing this formula to be filed without suspension, while making it clear
that only rates conforming to its model would be accepted.'" As the
carriers were in urgent need of an immediate increase in revenue,
each filed fare increases consistent with the Board's formula.' 38 The
court held that tariffs filed pursuant to the CAB's "speaking order"
were unlawful.'" It found that the Board's tariff acceptance practice
amounted to agency rate-making, since the airlines had no option to
choose among alternatives in fashioning their rates.' 4 ° The court
concluded"' that the CAB, in implementing its formula as a substan-
tive order, had failed to comply with the public notice and hearing
requirements of the Federal Aviation Act.' 42
The court in Consolidated Edison found Moss inapposite. 143 In
contrast to Moss, where the discretion of the airlines was "so cir-
cumscribed as to have been almost nonexistent," 144 there was consid-
erable evidence in Consolidated Edison that the pipelines continued to
possess a high degree of independence and flexibility in fashioning
1 " Id. at 645.
'" 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
132 512 F.2d at 1339.
• ,	 333 The CAB's actions in Moss have been characterized as illustrative of an agency
"speaking order" in W. Gni-HORNE & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS, 685-90 (6th ed. 1974), and in Spritzer, Uses of the Summary Power to Suspend
Rates: An Examination of Federal Regulatory Agency Practices, l20 U. PA. L. REv. 39, 42, 77
(1971).
13' As acknowledged by the court in Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1339, the
procedures for suinmary agency action set forth in the statutes involved in Moss and
Consolidated Edison are very similar. Compare Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §
1482(d)-(e) (1970), with Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-d (1970).
139 430 F.2d at 900-02.
139 See id. at 896 n.25, 897 n.26 for a description of the CAB formula.
137 Id. at 896-97.
1 " Id, at 895.
139 Id. at 902.
145 Id. at 897.
14'Id. at 900.
"2 49 U.S.C. 1482(d)-(e) (1970).
' 43 512 F.2d at 1342.
144
 National Ass'n of Motor Bus Carriers v. FCC, 460 F.2d 561, 567 (2d Cir.
1972). See Moss, 430 F.2d at 897.
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curtailment plans despite the existence of Order No. 467) 45 The
court found that several major pipelines had either non-467 type
plans in operation, or plans which, while in substantial compliance
with Order No. 467, included significant modifications of the end use
priority scheme.'" The crucial fact distinguishing Moss, then, was the
practical scope of discretion retained by the pipelines in fashioning
their curtailment plans.
This factual distinction was buttressed by two additional find-
ings. First, Order No, 467 did not cover all aspects of curtailment pol-
icy; indeed, significant elements of petitioner's own filings were out-
side the purview of 467. 147 In Moss, on the other hand, the CAB's
rate-making formula had been all-encompassing, since it covered in
detail all aspects of airline pricing." 8 Second, the court in Consolidated
Edison did not find abuses of the sort faced by the court in Moss,'"
where the agency's price formula seemed to be unduly oriented to-
ward the interests of the industry it was designed to regulate, at the
expense of consumers.'" In contrast, the court's analysis in
Consolidated Edison revealed that the FPC's selection of end use
priorities did not favor the regulated concerns."' An additional as-
pect of this distinction was that in Moss, the CAB's rate formula ap-
peared to be the product of "behind-the-scenes" bartering between
the agency and the airlines." 2 Also, tariffs filed in conformity with
the formula were not subject to investigation after they became
effective.' 53 As such, public scrutiny of those tariffs had been effec-
tively circumscribed by the CAB. Order No. 467, however, envisions
further investigatory proceedings by the FPC) 54 and extensive hear-
ings on the pipeline filings were in fact held in the present cases." 5
While the FPC's choice of summary curtailment procedures under
section 4, in effect, favored "rapid implementation over prior hearing,
[it did not attempt] to avoid public scrutiny entirely."'" Accordingly,
the court in Consolidated Edison concluded that the FPC had properly
exercised its authority to shape pipeline curtailment practices, and
petitioners' Moss claim failed on the merits.'"
"x512 F.2d at 1341.
"° Id.
" 7 Id. "These included a ceiling on Ethel demands of priority customers based on
contract requirements and the definition of central terms such as 'gas supply
deficiency.' "Id.
' 4 ' 430 F.2d at 900-02.
' 4" 512 F.2d at 1342.
15° See Moss, 430 F.2d at 901-02.
151 See 512 F.2d at 1342.
152 See Moss, 430 F.2d at 900. In Consolidated Edison, the court characterized the
agency-oriented ratemaking in Moss as "behind the scenes" bartering. 512 F.2d at 1342.
153 430 F.2d at 900.
164 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6385 (1973).
155 512 F.2d at 1338, 1342.
1 " Id. at 1342.
' 57 See id. at 1342.
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The court in Consolidated Edison did acknowledge, however, that
FPC pressure was "clearly on" the pipelines to file curtailment
schedules conforming to published priorities. 158 While the amount
and type of pressure generated by 467 was not found to be so great
as to constitute an illegal "speaking order" of the sort condemned in
Moss, the court did recognize this pressure as a manifestation of
agency regulation through "raised eyebrow techniques."'" In uphold-
ing the validity of such techniques, which combine both agency
policy-making and adjudicative functions, the District of Columbia
Circuit has thus endorsed the Commission's summary exercise of reg-
ulatory power over the allocation of a major energy resource in a
period of serious national shortage. In so doing, the court has permit-
ted the Commission to implement its regulatory authority in a manner
which in less exigent circumstances would probably have been found
to be invalid.'" The court's conclusion that the Commission did not
exceed its statutory authority in implementing the end use priorities
of Order No. 467 under section 4 rather than section 5 proceedings is
consistent with the Supreme Court's observation in Louisiana Power &
Light that a shortage of marked proportions should properly be con-
sidered by the courts in defining the FPC's discretion to choose
among available procedures in its curtailment practices. 1 e' The court's
decision in Consolidated Edison on the Moss claim therefore favors ex-
pediency in the continued expansion of FPC influence over the cur-
tailment process under the exigent circumstances of the current
natural gas shortage." 2 The expanding role of the Commission which
emerges is that of a caretaker safeguarding the public interest, which
might otherwise be subverted if allocation decisions were left to the
dictates of private economic interests.'"
In Consolidated Edison, petitioner mounted a final challenge to
Commission practice under section 4 which was a more modest for-
mulation of the Moss claim. They contended that even though the
FPC need not hold full-blown hearings under section 5, the •Commis-
sion was obligated to undertake a threshold investigation for weak-
nesses or inequities in 467-type filings prior to their being effectuated
automatically under the thirty day provision in section 4. 1 " A similar
argument had been advanced and rejected in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v.
FPC,'" where the Fifth Circuit held that the FPC was not required to
conduct a hearing before giving interim approval to a pipeline cur-
tailment plan filed pursuant to Order No. 431. 166 The court in Atlanta
156 Id. at 1341.
159 Id.
1 " See id. at 1342; cf. American Smelting, 494 F.2d at 933.
."' See discussion in text at note 63 supra.
1" See also Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142, 148-49 (5th Cir. 1973).
' 63 See 512 F.2d at 1342.
1 " 512 F.2d at 1344.
165 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 149.
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Gas emphasized that the use of section 4 summary procedures facili-
tated effective agency action in meeting the exigencies presented by
the natural gas shortage. 1 B 7 In light of this general state of
"emergency," the Fifth Circuit construed the Louisiana Power & Light
decision as encouraging the Commission, in particular cases, "to act
'now' and find facts later."'"
The court in Consolidated Edison similarly rejected petitioners'
contention that the Commission's action under section 4 was arbitrary
for want of a preliminary finding that the 467-type schedules were
non-discriminatory. 183 The District of Columbia Circuit followed the
court in Atlanta Gas and noted that section 4 does not explicitly re-
quire the Commission to undertake a preliminary review before allow-
ing pipeline filings to take effect.'" Moreover, the court in
Consolidated Edison refused to infer such a duty under emergency
conditions."' By refusing to encumber section 4 proceedings with a
preliminary finding requirement, the District of Columbia Circuit ap-
pears to have construed the Court's decision in Louisiana Power &
Light as a broad mandate, granting the FPC maximum latitude for
shaping interim curtailment practices.' " 2
Thus the court in Consolidated Edison rejected both of petitioners'
main arguments; 173 namely, that the FPC should have implemented
Order No. 467 under section 5, or alternatively, that if the Commis-
sion was permitted to proceed under section 4, it should have held a
threshold investigation before giving automatic effectuation to the
proposed schedules. This judicial deference to FPC summary action
under section 4 proceedings was not, however, granted without some
uneasiness. 174 The court recognized that while clue process require-
ments could be satisfied by a subsequent hearing, 175 irrevocable ef-
fects were likely to flow from the implementation of curtailment plans
on an interim basis.'" Coupled with this recognition was an awareness
that utilization of section 4 procedures for curtailment is heavily de-
' 61 Id. at 148-49.
' 68 Id. at 148.
' 69 512 F.2d at 1344-45.
10 See id. at 1344.
' 7 ' Id. n.71.
"5 1d.
"3 1d. at 1342, 1344-45.
"' Id. at 1342-43, 1344-45.
"6 /d. at 1344 n.71.
"0 1d. at 1343.
Curtailments have resulted in severe economic and environmental conse-
quences, resulting in the closing of schools and factories, the denial of util-
ity service to new customers, the utilization by industry and electric utilities
of alternate fuels which impact upon ambient air quality standards, and
the transfer of unfulfilled demand to other fuels in short supply with re-
sultant upward price pressures.
38 Fed. Reg. 27606 (1973). For further discussion of the irrevocable effects likely to
arise from curtailment, with specific reference to the 1973-74 winter heating season, see id. at
27607-10.
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pendent upon "each pipeline's unique knowledge of its customers'
needs, [and] ability to substitute other fuel sources...." 177 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit noted with concern that where a pipeline's
plan is shaped, at least in part, by Commission policy, "that unique
knowledge may play a diminished role,""B with the risk of customer
injury increased according. In an effort to forestall this possibility of
irreparable injury, the court in Consolidated Edison placed heavy re-
liance on the Commission's "conscientious discharge of its oversight
function" in monitoring interim curtailment plans in operation.'"
While judicial reliance on continued self-monitoring activity by
the FPC does not eliminate the policing function of the courts con-
templated in Pacific Gas,'" it does represent a substantial retreat from
judicial scrutiny of agency abuses in the curtailment process during
periods of shortage. Judicial deference to such agency action springs,
in part, out of a desire to avoid the "kind of ad hoc second guessing
that would demoralize conscientious agency officials and undermine
the reliability of agency judgments."'" In any event, the courts have
now upheld the Commission's promulgation,'" implementation," 3
and application of Order No. 467. 1 " There would seem, therefore, to
be little likelihood that Commission curtailment practice under that
order, with the possible exception of its application, 1 B 5 will continue to
command judicial scrutiny.'"
1 " 512 F.2d at 1343, quoting Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. at 645.
"" 512 F.2d at 1342-43.
"5 /d. at 1343.
"° See text at note 79 supra.
"1
 Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD.
L. REV. 199, 207 (1974).
102 Paci fic  Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
` 5dConsolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1344-45.
"4 Id. at 1342.
"5 Cf. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, (D.C. Cir, 1970),
cert. den., 403 U.S. 923 (1972), where the District of Columbia Circuit suggested that
tilts supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case
of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative
charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a
combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a "hard
look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned
decision-making.
Id. at 851.
185
 Petitions for certiorari have been filed in two companion cases: Pacific Light-
ing Service Co. v. FPC, 518 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), petition far cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 3132 (U.S. Sept. 5, 1975) (No. 350), and California v. FPC, 518 F.2d 718
(9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3133 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1975)
(No. 359). While due process considerations are applicable to Commission actions under
section 4, the existence of exigent circumstances is a recognized factor in making a de-
termination of hearing requirements. Deferral of hearings under section 4 interim ac-
tions woud seem appropriate in view of emergency conditions necessitating the
Commission's prompt response. ft would seem unlikely, therefore, that due process
challenges to section 4 summary action will prove successful. See 512 F.2d at 1344-45
n.71 and cases cited therein.
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Nevertheless, the broad latitude permitted the FPC in imple-
menting curtailment schedules through summary proceedings is an
invitation to abuse, for the risk of arbitrary action is surely increased
where an agency acts without "the moderating constraint that the
prospect of a prior hearing typically imposes on administrative
initiatives." 187 The court in Consolidated Edison noted as an example of
such agency abuse the fact that the interim plan of at least one of the
pipelines involved in the case was explicitly rejected by the Commis-
sion because it did "not conform to the standards for priorities of de-
liveries as enunciated by Order Nos. 467, 467-A and 467-B." 188 This
adherence to the priorities of 467 therefore suggests that the FPC, at
least in one instance, did arbitrarily treat the order as a binding rule,
The result of this Commission action was that the proposed curtail-
ment plan did not receive consideration on its merits, thereby increas-
ing the possibility of customer injury.'"
B. Proposed Amendment to Section 4 Summary Action
In seeking to facilitate Commission responses to the exigencies of
the natural gas shortage, the courts have refused to encumber section
4 curtailment proceedings with a preliminary hearing requirement.'°°
Doubtless prompt agency action during penods of shortage could be
crucial to the welfare of the Nation. However, summary action in and
of itself cannot substitute for effective and responsible agency action.
In this respect, the "continued monitoring function" of the Commis-
sion, posited in Consolidated Edison"' as a check on its own summary
action has two significant shortcomings: (1) it does not provide an ef-
fective restraint on agency misuse of summary power, since the
Commission may still elect to treat Order No. 467, sub silentio, as a
substantive rule in reviewing pipeline initiated curtailment filings; 182
and (2) it does not sufficiently encourage development of more stan-
dardized guidelines, through which existing inequities in pipeline cur-
tailment filings might be gradually eliminated.' 93
Section 4 of the Natural Gas' Act provides that a decision to
suspend a company's filing must be accompanied "by a statement in
writing of [the Commission's] reasons for such suspension."'" No
'"' Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28
(1972).
'"" 512 F.2d at 1343-44 n.67.
189 See id. The court avoided resolution of this issue on the merits because the al-
ternative plans no longer appeared viable. Id. at 1343-44.
See, e.g., Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1344-45; Atlanta Gas, 976 F.2d at 149.
151 512 F.2d at 1343.
See id. at 1349 n.67.
153 One author suggests that inconsistent commission actions on various pipeline
filings, particularly with respect to the extension of interim non-467-B curtailment
plans, may afford the basis for challenges to these actions as discriminatory or arbitrary.
See Muys, FPC Allocation of Natural Gas Supply Shortages: Prorationing, Priorities and Per-
plexity, 20 ROCKY MT. M. L. INs .r. 301, 358 (1975).
'" 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970).
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similar requirement is placed on the Commission where it summarily
permits an industry-proposed curtailment schedule to go into effect.
The Commission practice of allowing 467-type curtailment schedules
to take effect, without giving any reasons for its application in the
particular circumstances, permits both the pipelines and the FPC alike
to effectively treat Order No. 467 as a substantive rule.'" At present,
there is little impetus for a pipeline to file schedules deviating from
the priorities established by Order No. 467. 1 ° 6
Yet experience has 'proven that 467-type plans are not always
best suited to the protection of "human needs" users, 1 ' 7 for whose
benefit the 467 allocation scheme was designed.'" Where a 467 plan
is filed and accepted, although unsuited to protect such high priority
users in the given circumstances,'" the opportunity to offset the dis-
ruptive economic impact incident to curtailment 2 °0
 is reduced. Under
existing guidelines a pipeline customer's sole recourse is to appeal for
emergency relief through the hearings process. 2" During this time-
consuming process, 202
 in which the FPC may or may not perform its
"oversight function," the likelihood of such disruptive economic injury
increases. 203
To say that section 4 summary action has pervasive implications,
1" As noted in Pacific Gas, "[t]he pipelines sell all the gas they can during periods
of shortage and consequently are not overly concerned with which customers receive
it." 506 F.2d at 36. Pipelines are, however, concerned with the possibility of civil liability
for failing to meet contract requirements. The court in Consolidated Edison recognized
that "pipelines may reasonably estimate their risks to be less if they curtail under a plan
which is likely to be upheld by the FPC, rather than a plan which is likely to be rejected
as unlawful and replaced with another." 512 F.2d at 1340. With this recognition arises
the danger that the pipelines will be apt to treat Order No. 467 as a substantive rule.
The prospect of the Commission treating Order No. 467 as a substantive rule
was recognized early as a result of Order No. 467-B, where the FPC voiced its general
intention to accept 467-type filings, and to permit such filings to take effect without
suspension. 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6385 (1973), That the Commission has, in fact, treated
Order No. 467 as a substantive rule was acknowledged by the court in Consolidated Edi-
son, 512 F.2d at 1343-44 n.67.
199
	
note 195 supra. As the Commission itself has pointed out, pipelines "un-
doubtedly recognize the risks attendant to curtailing under any plan which does not
conform to Order No. 467-B." Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1340.
'° 2 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372;379-81 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(per curiam).
198 See text at notes 65-66 supra.
199
	 note 197 supra.
2°° See notes 176 supra and 203 infra for a description of the potential disruptive
impact of curtailment upon natural gas consumers.
2°' 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(a)(4)-(b) (1975).
102 Delays seem inherent in the process, as the FPC has struggled to keep up with
what one author has characterized as a "deluge" of petitions for extraordinary relief.
Muys, supra note 193, at 352.
"3 Although unnecessary curtailments may be remedied by adjustments in gas al-
location, other effects flowing from such action may not be so easily cured, for "in addi-
tion to its immediate effects, which may themselves be harsh, summary action often
generates [unfavorable] publicity that causes damage more enduring and extensive than
do the terms of the summary order itself." Freedman, supra note 187, at 33.
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both for the legality of conduct by the Commission and regulated
pipelines,'" as well as for the economic dislocation of pipeline
customers, 2 " 5 is not, however, to suggest that its exercise should be
subject to greater judicial scrutiny. An attempt must be made to strike
a balance between the danger that summary power would be abused,
or that it would wrongfully injure, and the benefit derived from it in
permitting prompt FPC responses to the natural gas shortage.'" Such
a balance may be struck, it is submitted, by providing for greater pub-
lic disclosure by the Commission of the reasons behind its summary
action in all section 4 curtailment proceedings.
Public scrutiny of the reasons for Commission decisions in sec-
tion 4 curtailment proceedings is compelled principally by summary
action's capacity to wrongfully impose serious injury. 207 The factual
basis for a particular exercise of Commission summary authority may
be erroneous; 208 or the likelihood of error may be compounded by a
Commission tendency to adopt schedules that may prove, in retro-
spect, unnecessarily broad to protect the public interest. 2" The
bounds of error resulting from this tendency may be narrowed by
public surveillance and the FPC's prompt corrective response. 2 " A
"policing function" performed by the private sector is especially war-
ranted since judicial review has been largely unavailable to date. 2 "
Disclosure, then, would serve to increase the ability of the public to
discern any discrepancy between Commission premises in summarily
permitting curtailment schedules to go into effect, and the actual con-
ditions toward which those schedules are directed. 212
Significant benefits should flow from a requirement that the
"4 See note 195 .supra,
2 ° 5 See notes 176 and 203 supra.
" Cf. Spritzer, Uses of the Summary Power to Suspend Rates: An Diamination of Fed-
eral Regulatory Agency Practices, 120 U. PA. L. Rrty. 39, 40 (1971).
2 ° 7 See notes 176, 197 and 203.
2°" While the FPC has sought to compile and .appropriately categorize reliable
end use data—indeed, such a process is at the heart of its 467 curtailment policy—T.)11e
control over efficient, accurate development of end-use data has been nonexistent."
Muys, supra note 193, at 327. One author has viewed this less-than-successful Commis-
sion fact gathering process as the "Achilles heel of its program." ld,
200 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372, 379-81 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (per curiam).
" One author suggests that "an administrative agency has an obligation in fair-
ness to hold an adjudicatory hearing promptly so that the adverse impact of its sum-
mary order on the individual will be confined to the shortest possible period." Freed-
man, supra note 187, at 52.
211
	
present, considerable difficulties may be encountered in compiling a stall-
dent record to permit meaningful judicial review. Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844,
871-72 (5th Cir. 1973); see Pacific Gas, 506 F.2d at 49.
2 " Gl Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Commission, 477 F.2d 402, 408-09 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("The articulation of reasons by an agency—for itself and for the public—does
afford a safeguard against arbitrary and careless action and is apt to result in greater
consistency in an agency's decision-making." Id. at 408.). See also Environmental Defense
Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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FPC disclose the reasons behind its summary action. First, a Commis-
sion disclosure practice would serve to check potential FPC abuse of
section 4 proceedings, since the reasoning employed and adopted by
it for not challenging pipeline curtailment filings would now be subject
to public scrutiny. 2 ' 3 By providing the public with relevant informa-
tion and the criteria utilized in the decision-making process, a more
complete record for review could be presented to a court examining
customer petitions which sought to compel the Commission to con-
scientiously discharge its over-sight function. 214 In addition, a review-
ing court could analyze the disclosed information to ensure itself that
the Commission was tailoring its actions to the proposed plan before
it, instead of attempting to enforce a general rule such'as 467 without
any data to rationally support its application in the given
circumstances. 215 The courts, then, would be better equipped to per-
form the "policing function" suggested in Pacific Gas in checking
agency abuses. 2 ' 8
A disclosure policy would also benefit the FPC by increasing
public confidence in the Commission's curtailment practices. Such
confidence in the curtailment process is essential if FPC summary ac-
tion is to be perceived as legitimate, both by those who are directly af-
fected by Commission decisions, and by the general public as well."'
" 3 Apart from a formal disclosure process under section 4, it is quite possible
that agency memoranda of final decisions not to suspend pipeline filings would be dis-
coverable under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). How-
ever, the process of securing access to such documentation of agency action under the
FOIA can be quite time consuming, see W. CrE1.1.11ORNE k C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 572 (6th ed. 1974), especially where a suit must be filed to compel
production of required documents. In instances where exemptions are involved, as for
example, the exemption for intra-agency memoranda, 5 U.S.C. § 552(6)(5) (1970), an
agency may contest public disclosure. Such a process, then, is not suited to the exigen-
cies of the gas shortage, since delay increases the prospects of irreparable injury. For
this reason, a formal disclosure mechanism with respect to decisions in section 4 sum-
mary action would more effectively facilitate public scrutiny than citizen requests under
the FOIA.
214
 See note 211 supra.
215 Cf. Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844, 872.73 (5th Cir. 1973).
21. cy: Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). where the Supreme
Court indicated that "[j]udicial review of the Commission's orders will therefore func-
tion accurately and efficaciously only if the Commission indicates fully and carefully the
... purposes for which it has chosen to act ...." Id. at 792. In Citizens Ass'n v, Zoning
Commission, 447 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cit . : 1973), the court acknowledged that
[t]he case for requiring a statement of reasons from an administra-
tive agency is a persuasive One. Those reasons may be crucial in order for
the court to knoW what the agency has really determined, hence, what to
review. Courts ought not to have to speculate as to the basis for an ad-
ministrative agency's conclusions; nor can a court 'assume without explana-
tion that proper standards are implicit in every act of agency discretion.'
And when faced with a complex problem, having widespread
ramifications, like that before us today, a court should surely have the
benefit of the agency's expertise.
Id. at 408.
2" Cf. Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial Type Hearings for Resolving Complex
Scientific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. l I I, 146-50 (1972).
280
NOTES
For this reason, the criteria articulated by the FPC in taking summary
action should be the same as those which were, in fact, employed by it
in making the actual decision. This would serve to help dispel nega-
tive impressions of FPC activity, caused by procedures that have made
the Commission seem increasingly remote and secretive. 218
A further benefit to be derived from Commission disclosure is
that it would facilitate the refinement of FPC decision-theory 2 " as ex-
perience and the public recomrnend. 22 " More standardized curtail-
ment guidelines could then emerge from principles garnered in par-
ticular exercises of Commission summary action.'" Such standardiza-
tion would, in turn, promote consistency in the treatment accorded
lower priority, similarly situated customers, by the pipelines in their
curtailment filings. 222 In this way, inequities in proposed plans might
gradually be eliminated, thereby lessening the tremendous pressure
presently on the Commission to grant petitions for emergency
relief. 223 Additionally, this would ease the burden of monitoring in-
terim plans imposed in Consolidated Edison, 224 by mitigating the likeli-
hood that the Commission would need to make dramatic adjustments
in a pipeline's gas allocation practices. Thus, a disclosure requirement
might ultimately result in increased consistency and effectiveness in
the curtailment process, while preserving the Commission's ability to
take prompt action during times of shortage. 225 At the same time,
2 " Such agency action creates the appearance of what Senator Dirksen once
called "anonymous Neros fiddling away at their own tunes." Gilliam, Recent Developments
in Regulation of Natural Gas Sales, 19 ROCKY MT. M. L. INs.r.. 171, 203 (1974).
See Boyer, supra note 217, at 159.
Decision theory seeks to provide scientific methods for dealing with uncer-
tainty. It builds upon the "subjective theory" or probability, which seeks to
analyze the degree of belief that a rational, coherent decision maker would
possess in varying factual circumstances, including a situation in which
probabilities are continuously re-evaluated as new data becomes available.
Id. See also Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the
Subjective Approach, 1 U. Toi,Kno L. REV. 538, 551-53 (1969).
220 Recent FPC monitoring of alternative fuel demand and supply is illustrative
of this process. See Reporting Form 69, Alternative Fuel Demand of Direct End Use
Customers of Interstate Pipeline Companies due to Natural Gas Curtailments, 40 Fed.
Reg. 27645, 27647-48 (1975).
221 A practical method by which an administrative agency can lay a found-
ation for the eventual promulgation of rules or guidelines is to provide
a statement of reasons whenever it takes summary action. This would
permit an agency gradually to develop generalized criteria out of' par-
ticular fact situations [and to promulgate regulations accordingly].
Freedman, supra note 187, at 28. Freedman, however, acknowledged arguments con-
trary to this position. Id. at 45.
992 With regard to an impetus to promote consistent treatment, see note 193
supra.
493 The Commission has been "deluged" with petitions for such relief. See Muys,
supra note 193, at 352.
224 512 F.2d at 1343.
211 The Commission would not be forced to hold a preliminary hearing under
section 4, in order to acquire sufficient data to articulate its reasoning in summarily
permitting a particular curtailment plan to take effect. Under the Natural Gas Act, 15
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benefits derived from disclosure would complement the Commission's
curtailment "oversight function" in such a way as to fill existing reg-
ulatory "gaps" which threaten the public interest; namely, the danger
of agency abuse of summary action, and the problem of inequity in
gas allocation among customers similarly situated.
The principal countervailing considerations to public disclosure
of the FPC's reasons for summary action include: (1) the practicability
of endorsing and releasing staff recommendations which may have
predicated Commission action; 226
 (2) the practicability of preparing an
independent opinion or memorandum stating reasons for permitting
a curtailment schedule to take effect without objection; and (3) the ex-
tent to which .preparation and issuance of reasons would delay Com-
mission disposition of matters.227
 To date, the principal concern of
the judiciary has been to insure efficiency and expediency in the
FPC's response to the exigencies of the natural gas shortage. 228 Yet
courts have also repeatedly acknowledged the need to facilitate
effective interim action by the Commission, 229
 while lengthy section 5
hearings proceed on permanent curtailment plans. The effectiveness
of the FPC's interim response to conditions of shortage is, however,
contingent upon a balancing of efficiency considerations against the
impact of summary action on social and economic interests, the ade-
quacy of subsequent hearings or emergency relief to protect these in-
terests, and the threat of misuse of such power. When the countervail-
ing considerations to requiring the FPC's explanation of its summary
action are balanced against benefits to be derived from such a prac-
tice, disclosure will surely emerge as ultimately serving the public in-
terest.
It remains an open question whether the judiciary or the legisla-
U.S.C. ft 717i(a) (1970) (periodic and special reports), the FPC may compel specific
answers from jurisdictional pipeline companies to all questions upon which the Com-
mission may have a need for information, and such has been the Commission's practice
during the natural gas shortage. Indeed, "data verification committees [of the FPC]
generally draft elaborate questionnaires which are sent to the pipeline's customers in an
effort to elicit information on the most critical issues." Muys, supra note 193, at 329. For
an exploration of problems in the end-use data collection and verification areas, see id.
at 326-31.
226
 Exemption from public disclosure of such information may be required under
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 55 2(b)(4 )-(5 ) (1970). See Continental Oil
Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 33-36 (5th Cir. 1975) where the court held that public disclo-
sure of information filed pursuant to an FPC order contravened exemption (b)(4) of the
FOIA (confidential commercial or financial information). While FOIA exemption re-
quirements may narrow the scope of disclosure by the FPC, they do not otherwise pre-
vent disclosure of non-privileged reasons for agency action. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)-(b)
(1970).
"7 Cf Committee on Informal Action of the Administrative Conference of the
United States, Guidelines for Study of Informal Action in Federal Agencies, 24 An. L. REV.
173, 199-200 (1972).
4!8 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. at 643-46; Atlantic Gas Light, 476
F.2d at 148-49.
229 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. at 645; Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d
at 1344-46; Atlanta Gas Light, 476 F.2d at 149.
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ture is better suited and inclined to strike this balance in favor of dis-
closure, and thereby permit a greater participation by the public in
defining what is in its own interest. In other regulatory contexts, the
courts seem, in an accelerating degree, to be imposing the require-
ment that informal action be explained by the agency. 23° Indeed, the
Supreme Court has stated as a "simple but fundamental rule of ad-
ministrative law" that an agency must set forth clearly the grounds on
which it acts. 23 ' However, in view of the recent reluctance of courts to
in any way encumber section 4 proceedings, 232 a disclosure amend-
ment by Congress would be the likely and appropriate means by
which to effectuate a change in FPC curtailment practice. 233
PIPELINE LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
During this period of increasing energy scarcity, the courts have
moved to define the bounds of FPC curtailment authority, and the
summary manner in which it is to be exercised. 234 Yet the question
remains as to what effect these decisions will have on the civil liability
of the pipelines for their failure to supply contract requirements to
their customers. One of' the most persistent objections to FPC curtail-
ment policy has been that it disrupts contractual relations. 23° Decisions
such as Consolidated Edison, affirming FPC power to summarily imple-
ment non-contractual allocation orders, raise the question of whether
this disruption amounts to a supervening governmental order. Resolu-
tion of' this issue will, in large part, fix the burden of and determine
who may profit from the shortage of natural gas, 236 since under gen-
eral contract principles, a contractual duty will be discharged where
performance is prevented by a supervening government regulation or
administrative order. 237
"' See, e.g., Atchison v. Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-09 (1973) (agency's
duty to explain its departure from prior norms); Brooks v. AEC, 476 F.2d 924, 926-27
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (administrative agencies must provide a statement of
reasons, especially in cases where public interest demands close scrutiny of agency ac-
tions); Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Commission, 477 F.2d 402, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (re-
quirement of reasons should not be limited to formal proceedings, but should extend to
all determinations); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596-98
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (courts should require administrative officers to articulate in as much
detail as possible. standards and principles that govern their discretionary decisions
touching upon fundamental personal interests of life, health and liberty).
'3 ' Atchison v. Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973), citing SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
232 See text at notes 170-72 sutra.
233 For a recent listing of legislative action affecting FPC functions and jurisdic-
tion, see 1974 FPC ANN. REP. 63-71.
' 3 ' See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light, 406 U.S. 631-47; Pacific Gas, 506 F.2d at
40-45; American Smelting and Refining, 494 F.2d at 932-36; and Atlanta Gas Light, 476
F.2d at 148-49.
233 See American Smelting and Refining, 494 F.2d at 933.
232 See Note, Liability of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies For Breach of Contract Due to
FPC-Ordered Curtailment, DUKE L. J. 867, 871 (1973).
"'See 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1346, at 433 (rev. ed. 1962); 6 S. WILLISTON, A
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The FPC initially took the position that its curtailment orders
would in all cases constitute an absolute defense on the theory of im-
possibility of performance. due to an intervening governmental
order. 238 The courts, however, have not agreed with the
Commission. 239 In International Paper Co. v. FPC, 24° the Fifth Circuit
declined to affirm Commission opinions declaring liability insulation
to be an "automatic concomitant" of curtailment orders."' Subsequent
FPC pronouncements 242 were shaped by Judge Brown's concurring
opinion in International Paper, which suggested that liability would be
imposed if a pipeline's need to curtail resulted from its own negli-
gence, bad faith, or other wrongful conduct. 243 While courts have
continued to identify this problem of liability, 244 the matter has not
yet been fully litigated. 245 In both Pacific Gas and Consolidated Edison,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowl-
edged concern of pipeline companies that withholding gas due under
existing contracts may subject them to civil liability.'" Although the
liability issue was not raised in either case, the reasoning employed by
the court in upholding Order No. 467 is not without implication to a
resolution of this question.
It has been suggested that determination of whether an action
for breach of contract will lie, where Commission regulation has hin-
dered performance, will depend in part upon the degree of control
the FPC is held to have over the contracts. 247 To date, curtailment has
progressed along the guidelines established under Order No. 467. In
upholding this order, the court in Pacific Gas concluded that the order
was merely a statement of policy, without the "force of law. "248 Again,
in Consolidated Edison, the basis of the court's decision lay in the de-
gree of practical discretion left open to the pipelines in filing their
curtailment plans. 249 The critical unresolved question emerging from
cases delineating FPC summary action, then, is whether judicial em-
phasis on the practical alternatives open to curtailing pipelines will be
sufficient to mitigate defense claims of intervening governmental
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1939, at 5432-34 (rev. ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 458(b), at 852 (1932).
338 See International Paper Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 121,125 (5th Cir. 1973).
'22 International Paper Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 121,125 (5th Cir. 1973); see
Monsanto Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 799, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2" 476 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1973).
24 ' Id. at 129; Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844, 866 (5th Cir. 1974) (so construing
International Paper).
2" See, e.g., United Gas Pipeline Co., 50 FPC 1348, 1368 (1973); United Gas
Pipeline Co., 49 FPC 1211, 1220-21 (1973).
243 476 F.2d at 131-32 (concurring opinion).
144 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1340; Pacific Gas. 506 F.2d at 35-36
n.8.
243 512 F.2d at 1340.
948 See Pacific Gas, 506 F.2d at 35-36 n.84 Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1340.
242 See, Note, supra note 237, at 871.
348 506 F.2d at 42-43.
248 See 512 F.2d at 1341-42.
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order. Final resolution of this question will depend upon a myriad of
factors,250 and there is no real basis for forecasting an answer at this
time. Nevertheless, two approaches now appear to be open to custom-
ers seeking damages 2 " from pipelines failing to meet contract re-
quirements: (1) pipelines will continue to be vulnerable to arguments
based on their own complicity in necessitating curtailment; 252 and (2)
rationales employed by the courts in upholding summary section 4
proceedings appear to have eroded pipeline defenses based on "inter-
vening governmental order."'" With the question of who shall receive
the available supply of natural gas virtually resolved,'" the next cur-
tailment question for the courts will' in all likelihood be, "who shall
pay for it?"255
I V. CONCLUSION
As this country moves from a posture of energy abundance to
one of relative scarcity, discussion over the distribution of existing re-
sources permeates both the private and public sectors. Even as the
debate continues, the decreasing natural gas supply has compelled an
immediate response by the Federal Power Commission, which has, as
a result, employed summary procedures for curtailment purposes.
Procedural mechanisms originally designed to insure competitive
market conditions have been utilized in meeting the exigencies of our
era of shortage. This transformation in function has been fully en-
dorsed by the courts. 2" Yet, while expediting Commission use of
summary power, the judiciary is now voicing an increased concern
over the danger of irreparable injury incident to such practice.'"
In upholding FPC summary action in Consolidated Edison, the
District of Columbia Circuit charged the Commission with the respon-
sibility to mitigate the threat of economic hardship incurred in the
curtailment process. 25 " It is submitted that solitary reliance on the
8 " For a brief discussion of the interests to be balanced, see Note, supra note 237,
at 893-96; Comment, FPC Natural Cas Allocation: Curtailment in Context, 50 TexAs L.
Rev. 1370, 1403-04 (1972).
251
 Damages might include extra substitute fuel costs and expenses incident to
the location of such fuel; expenses involved in accommodating heating processes to
burning fuels other than natural gas; and potentially special damages, subject of course
to general contract law governing such awards. See Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at
1343; Mississippi Public Serv. Cont'n v. FPC, 522 F.2d 1345, 1347.50 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 2
 International Paper, 476 F.2d at 131-32 (concurring opinion).
253 See text at notes 248-49 supra.
"4 See text at notes 182-86 and note 186 supra.
255
 See e,g., Mississippi Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 522 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir.
1975) (The imposition of compensation payments as a condition for the receipt of
higher priority gas is within the statutory power of the FPC over the movement of such
gas in interstate commerce.).
256 See cases cited at note 234 supra.
252
 Consolidated Edison, 512 F.2d at 1342.43.
285 1d. at 1343.
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FPC's "continued monitoring function" is both inappropriate and in-
sufficient to provide an effective check against dangers associated with
summary actions. Increased public scrutiny of such Commission action
is suggested, facilitated through disclosure of the FPC's reasons for
summarily permitting pipeline curtailment plans to take effect without
challenge. At this juncture, guidelines to FPC summary action have
not been fully developed. The need for formulation of such
guidelines, either by the legislature or by the courts, is imperative if
sensible and fair domestic energy policy is to prevail.
PHILIP D. O'NEILL, JR.
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